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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction of this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred in dismissing this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Since there was no evidentiary hearing and documentary evidence was not in dispute, this Court 
should review the matter de novo. Kamdar & Co. v. Larav Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 
App. 1991). The issue was preserved in the trial court in Sterling's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 43) 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution: 
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law;.... 
Section 78-27-22, Utah Code Annotated: 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest 
demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress against 
nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this state, 
incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. This legislative action is 
deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially increased 
the flow of commerce between the several states resulting in increased interaction 
between persons of this state and persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this state, 
should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest 
extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
Section 78-27-23, Utah Code Annotated: 
As used in this act: 
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(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm, company, 
association, or corporation. 
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state" mean activities 
of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state which affect persons or 
business within the state of Utah. 
Section 78-27-24, Utah Code Annotated: 
Any person,...whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself,...to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business within this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty;.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sterling is a network marketing business based in Utah County. (R. 47, fflfl & 2) Sterling 
(a corporation) was organized in the State of Oregon. (R. 46, |2) On April 28, 1995, Sterling 
received a certificate of authority to transact business in the State of Utah. (R. 46, f2) Sterling 
moved its offices to Utah at that time. (R. 46, f2) Sterling is and has been at all times relevant 
hereto, a corporation in good standing with the State of Utah. (R. 46, f2) 
Defendant, who is a citizen of Michigan, was one of Sterling's distributors until 
terminated in February, 1996. (R. 46, Tf5) Defendant was terminated for conduct that violated 
Sterling's distributor policies and procedures. (R. 47, ^ [5) Specifically, defendant was terminated 
for "cross-sponsoring" or invading another sponsor's line of distributors. (R. 47, [^5) 
After his termination, defendant embarked on a course of retaliation. He started by 
threatening the two distributors who made the complaints about him. (R. 45, |6) He then 
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threatened individual members of Sterling's distributor advisory board, who played no role in his 
termination, but were merely advised of the action. (R. 45, |6) Defendant's threats were clearly 
intended to intimidate Sterling because of the importance of distributor confidence and morale to 
the success of its business. (R. 45, f 6) 
On March 29,1996, Sterling filed a "Verified Complaint for Money Damages and 
Injunctive Relief." (R. 6) Contrary to express instructions from Sterling's counsel, a copy of the 
Summons and Complaint were left with defendant's assistant at his office in Michigan. (R. 13, 
f 3) Sterling acknowledged that service was ineffective. (R. 43) Notwithstanding, defendant 
(through his counsel) made a "special appearance" and moved to quash the summons and dismiss 
the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. (R. 30) 
Defendant's motion was supported by a memorandum (R. 28) and an affidavit. (R. 12) 
Sterling filed a memorandum in opposition (R. 43) and an affidavit of William H. Spires, 
Sterling's president. (R. 47) Defendant filed a memorandum in reply (R. 54) and then a notice to 
submit. (R. 58) There was no hearing on the matter. The district court made a "Memorandum 
Decision" filed on August 1,1996. (R. 62) The court then, on September 25,1996, signed an 
"Order" granting defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 70) and "Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law," (R. 68) both prepared by defendant's counsel. Sterling filed its notice of appeal on 
October 24, 1996. (R. 79) 
On October 23,1996, defendant's counsel filed a notice of withdrawal. (R. 80) On 
November 12,1996, Sterling filed (and served upon defendant) a notice to appoint counsel or to 
appear in person. (R. 83) There had been no response from defendant, until March 26, 1997, 
when he appeared pro se and filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. Sterling had previously 
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moved (ex parte) for a fourteen day extension within which to file its brief on appeal. Said 
motion was granted by this Court on March 31,1997. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time defendant signed his "Preferred Customer Application," (R. 16) Sterling was 
based in Oregon. The "Statement of Policies and Procedures," delivered to defendant with his 
Application, states that "jurisdiction and venue shall lie with the place of acceptance of the 
distributor application, the State of Oregon." (R. 15, f 17) Defendant acknowledges signing the 
Application. (R. 11, f 5) He acknowledges receiving the Policies and Procedures. (R. 10, f 16) 
He specifically acknowledges paragraph 17 of the Policies, wherein he agreed that venue and 
jurisdiction would be in Oregon. (R. 10, f 16) 
Sterling moved to Utah, soon after defendant signed as a distributor. (R. 46, f2) 
Defendant knew about the move, admitting that he "continued to work as an independent 
distributor for Sterling when it moved its offices to Utah;...." (R. 11, f 10) While defendant 
claims that he "rarely had reason to call the State of Utah," (R. 11, f 10) he does not claim that he 
never called Utah. It would have been strange if defendant never called Utah: Sterling had no 
other offices. (R. 46, [^3) Utah was (and is) the source of all marketing and sales information 
about the company. (R. 46, f4) All sales order entry, fulfillment and customer service were 
handled in Utah. (R. 46,1f4) 
Perhaps most important, Utah was the source of defendant's commission check. (R. 46, 
Tf4) Checks were mailed to distributors from Sterling's office in Provo. (R. 46, f4) When 
problems arose with defendant's distributorship, he communicated with Sterling's office in Utah. 
(R. 45, |7) Since this dispute arose, Sterling has communicated repeatedly with defendant. (R. 
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45, T[7) Most if not all these communications were initiated by defendant. (R. 45, f7) These 
conversations were between defendant and Sterling's president, William H. Spires, whose office 
is in Provo. (R. 45, f7) 
Provo is the seat of all administrative, financial and sales operations for the company. (R. 
46, f2) All of the acts complained of in this action occurred after Sterling moved its offices to 
Provo. (R. 46, f 2) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Sterling made out a prima facie case that defendant had both "transacted business" 
and "caused tortious injury" in the State of Utah, satisfying Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(1) & (3). 
Defendant has never really questioned the application of Utah's long-arm statute to this case. 
2. This case is virtually indistinguishable from Burger King Corp. v. Rudcewicz, 
471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985). Utah statute requires that Utah courts assert personal 
jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent of the Fourteenth Amendment. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-22. The Fourteenth Amendment boundaries set by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Burger King are wide enough to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant. 
3. The Court is entitled to and should consider "the interstate judicial system's 
interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of controversies." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 
476-77, 105 S.Ct. 2184-85. It would be more efficient to litigate all controversies concerning 
Sterling's distributors in one place: Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
Sterling is not relying on the forum selection clause in the distributor agreement (f 17) to 
support its assertion of personal jurisdiction in this case. It makes no sense — for either party ~ 
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to litigate this case in Oregon. Sterling could just as easily argue, on the basis of the forum 
selection clause, that defendant had agreed to litigate where Sterling had its headquarters. The 
absence of a forum selection clause designating Utah has (or should have) no bearing on the 
outcome of this case. 
I. FOR PURPOSES OF UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE. DEFENDANT 
"TRANSACTED BUSINESS" AND CAUSED A "TORTIOUS INJURY" 
IN UTAH. 
Sterling is a Utah citizen asserting personal jurisdiction over a nonresident under Utah's 
long-arm statute. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-22, et seq.1 There has been no serious objection that 
this case fits within the list of activities that would make a person subject to jurisdiction in Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. (The district court treated this requirement as having been satisfied. 
(R. 61) The definition of "transacting business," Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(1), is incredibly 
broad: "[Activities of a nonresident person,...in this state which affect persons or businesses 
within the state of Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23(1). The word "affect" is not defined in the 
Statue. The dictionary defines it as: "to produce an effect upon." 
This Court had an opportunity to analyze Section 23(1) in Kamdar & Co. v. Larav Co.. 
Inc., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991). The statute does not require that defendant conduct his 
own trade or business in Utah; it is enough that he transact some business in the State, 
"regardless of whether it is related to the Utah resident's trade or the business of the 
nonresident." 815 P.2d at 248. In so ruling, the Court gave an example: "[I]f Laray used a 
computer in the course of its automotive trade or business, and sent that computer to Utah to be 
1
 Utah's long-arm statute is available to foreign corporations that are authorized to transact business in Utah. Hughes 
Tool Co. v. Meier. 486 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1973). 
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serviced, such would constitute the transaction of business within the State of Utah. If Laray 
failed to pay for such service, Utah's long-arm statute would grant the Utah courts jurisdiction 
over Laray." Id. 
While not identical to the circumstances here, the example is revealing. What defendant 
did was promote the sale of Utah products by directing that orders for those products be sent to 
Sterling in Utah. He did not place the orders himself; but it could be said that what he did, by his 
promotion activities, was send sales orders to Sterling in Utah. Defendant got paid, by Sterling, 
in Utah, for every product sold to one of the distributors he sponsored. Defendant's business was 
signing up or "sponsoring" new distributors. The way he made that happen was directing that 
they make contact with Sterling, in Utah; fill out a Preferred Customer Application; and list 
defendant as their "Sponsor." (R. 16) There was no other way for defendant to get paid. 
In addition to transacting business, defendant's conduct may also satisfy Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-24(3) for being "tortious." All Sterling has to show is the "causing of any injury within 
this state...." Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24(3). Only the "injury" must be shown in this State. 
Berrett v. Life Insurance Company. 623 F. Supp. 946, 950 (D. Utah 1985). It does not matter 
that the tortious conduct takes place elsewhere. In Frontier Federal Savings & Loan Association 
v. National Hotel Corporation. 675 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Utah 1987), jurisdiction was found to lie 
over a Florida resident who made false representations to an Oklahoma citizen, which caused 
damage to that citizen's interest in Utah property. 675 F. Supp. at 1297-98. Defendant is a 
Michigan resident who made threats to citizens of other states, including Utah, that have the 
potential to damage, if they have not already damaged, Sterling's reputation and its distributor 
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relations. Such damage would be directly felt by Sterling in Utah. Sterling would sell fewer of 
its products, reducing its profits, which would hurt those who work for Sterling in Utah. 
As stated above, there was never any serious dispute that Sterling had satisfied Utah's 
long-arm statute. The real question was whether asserting jurisdiction over defendant in this case 
violated due process. 
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IS 
BROAD ENOUGH TO ENCOMPASS JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT. 
The Utah legislature has directed Utah courts to "assert jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22. This imperative 
was observed by the Court in Brown v. Carnes Corporation. 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980): 
"The legislative mandate is clear. The protection afforded by the courts of this state must be 
applied to the fullest extent allowed by due process of law." 
Regrettably, the "legislative mandate" was ignored by the district court in this case. The 
district court was more concerned with affording nonresidents "the same protections here as we 
expect our citizens to be accorded there." R. 61 (quoting Union Ski Company v. Union Plastics 
Corporation. 548 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Utah 1976)). Having taken this up, the district court said 
nothing about what protection Michigan provides Utahns and other nonresidents. The bigger 
problem is that the district court's decision was based on Union Ski, one of the two Utah cases 
the Utah Supreme Court later determined to have been wrongly decided. See Abbott G.M. 
Diesel Inc. v. Piper Aircraft. 578 P.2d 850, 853 (Utah 1978V 
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The district court's error was compounded by its inexplicable failure to address Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, cited by Sterling in its Memorandum in 
Opposition. (RR. 36-33) Defendant had the good sense not to ignore it in its Reply. (RR. 50-48) 
Burger King was a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Miami. 
Like our case, litigation arose from the termination of a Burger King franchisee in Michigan. As 
in our case, the home office worked directly with the franchisee by handling all his credit 
problems, ordering cost-cutting measures and negotiating a partial refinancing of his debts. The 
home office was totally responsible for all termination matters. When the franchisee was 
terminated, he continued to occupy the restaurant in Michigan. Burger King commenced the 
litigation in Florida. 
Like the independent distributors in our case, Burger King franchisees received market 
research and advertising assistance from the home office. Unlike the distributors in this case, the 
franchisees were required to pay monthly royalties, advertising and sales promotion fees and rent 
computed in part from monthly gross sales. The difference is that Burger King franchisees were 
paid directly from their businesses and got to keep everything they made. In this case, the 
distributors look to Sterling for payment of their commissions. It should make no difference that 
Burger King franchisees made payments to Burger King while Sterling distributors looked to 
Sterling for payment. The impact of these business activities, for due process reasons, is exactly 
the same. 
Much like defendant in this case, the franchisee argued that he had no physical ties to 
Florida: He maintained no offices in the State and had apparently never visited the State. 
However, the Supreme Court recognized that the dispute grew directly out of a contract that had 
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a "substantial connection" with Florida. 471 U.S. at 479, 105 S.Ct. at 2186. Importantly, the 
franchisee complained that it was unfair to require him, an individual, to travel to Florida to 
litigate with a large corporation. The Court noted: "[A] defendant who has purposefully derived 
a commercial benefit from his affiliations in a forum may not defeat jurisdiction there simply 
because of his adversary's greater net wealth." 471 U.S. at 485 n.25,105 S.Ct. at 2188 n.25. 
There is virtually no way to distinguish the two cases. There is not even the interposition 
of regional offices, as there was in Burger King. The Supreme Court rejected all jurisdictional 
arguments: "Rudzewicz most certainly knew that he was affiliating himself with an enterprise 
based primarily in Florida....Moreover, the parties' actual course of dealing repeatedly confirmed 
that decision making authority was vested in the Miami headquarters....When problems arose 
over building design, site-development fees, rent computation, and the defaulted payments, 
Rudzewicz...learned that the Michigan office was powerless to resolve their disputes and could 
only channel their communications to Miami. Throughout these disputes, the Miami 
headquarters and the Michigan franchisee [] carried on a continuous course of direct 
communications by mail and by telephone, and it was the Miami headquarters that made the key 
negotiating decisions out of which the instant litigation arose." 471 U.S. at 481, 105 S.Ct. at 
2186-87. 
There can be no question that in this case, defendant "purposefully derived a commercial 
benefit from his affiliations" in Utah. That was his commission check, and that is the most 
substantial consideration for a network marketing distributor. Additionally, defendant entered 
into a contract which, at the time the disputes arose, had a "substantial connection" with Utah. 
This is evidenced by the fact that when defendant tried to resolve the disputes, he communicated 
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with the offices in Utah, not Oregon. As a result, it must be said that defendant "purposefully 
availed" himself of the privilege of conducting business activities here. Due process would be no 
more offended by the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case than it was in Burger King. 
It makes no difference that defendant originally signed an agreement making Oregon the 
forum for disputes. The defendants in Kamdar & Co. made a similar argument. They claimed 
that because the agreement was signed in California, "they did not purposefully avail themselves 
of the privilege of conducting business in Utah, nor did they anticipate being hauled into court 
here." 815 P.2d at 249. The Court noted that "[a]t any time, the defendants were free to choose a 
new accountant who did not live in Utah. Instead, year after year, for eighteen years, they chose 
to have a Utah company perform their accounting and financial services." Id. 
We believe the Court was saying that you look to what the parties were doing, during the 
time in question, rather than to what they did when they started their business association. In 
other words, defendant may have looked to Oregon when he first entered the distributor 
agreement. But when he continued doing business with Sterling, after it moved to Utah, he must 
necessarily have looked to Utah, not Oregon, for all matters relating to his distributorship. No 
matter where Sterling started life, it was a Utah citizen at the time of the dispute with defendant. 
Defendant knew this. When problems arose with his distributorship, he spoke directly with 
Sterling's president in Provo. All decisions concerning defendant's distributorship were made in 
Provo. Defendant must have expected being "hauled" into court here. 
III. LITIGATING DISTRIBUTOR CLAIMS IN UTAH WOULD PROMOTE 
EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION OF CONTROVERSIES. 
Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. As this Court stated in Kamdar & Co.: "We 
must also balance 'the convenience of the parties and the interests of the State in assuming 
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jurisdiction,' by examining 'the relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, to 
each other.'" 815 P.2d at 249 (quoting Mallorv Engineering v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, 618 
P.2d 1004, 1008 (Utah 1980)). Among the factors that the Court may consider are (1) "the 
plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," and (2) "the interstate judicial 
system's interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of controversies." Burger King Corp., 
471 U.S. at 476-77,105 S.Ct. at 2184-85. 
What would be more "convenient and effective": Forcing Sterling to litigate disputes 
with its distributors in all fifty states, or making Utah the forum for disputes with all its 
distributors? Just as defendant stated: When he signed up with Sterling, he looked to Oregon to 
resolve disputes. He has never explained why it was any less reasonable to look to Utah, when 
he knew that Sterling had moved its offices. In this day and age, it is not nearly as burdensome 
to litigate in a different state. More and more discovery, conferences and even hearings are 
taking place over the telephone or by fax. Litigants can even have their local counsel appear pro 
hac vice with very little added expense. We do not deny some added expense to defendant, but 
he cannot show that is much more than Sterling will incur. Sterling will have to travel to 
Michigan to depose defendant; defendant will have to travel to Utah to try the case. They will 
both have to travel to interview or depose other witnesses. Looked at dispassionately, the burden 
argument avails very little. 
CONCLUSION 
Sterling is a Utah citizen who has been wronged by a nonresident. The dispute arises out 
of defendant's breach of an agreement entered into between defendant and Sterling. Defendant 
was terminated in accordance with provisions contained in that agreement. When notified that 
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he was going to be terminated, defendant attempted to negotiate the matter with Sterling and in 
doing so, he had frequent conversations with Sterling in Utah. After his termination was upheld, 
defendant retaliated by threatening the two distributors who made complaints about his 
performance under the agreement. He followed that up with threats at Sterling's distributor 
advisory board. While most of these individuals reside out of State, Sterling was the ultimate 
target. The best way to get at a network marketing business is to get at its distributors. A 
network marketing business will fail without distributor confidence. Distributors will lose 
confidence if they are not protected from threats by former distributors. This case is being 
litigated, by both parties, as aggressively as it is, for these very reasons. The decision in this case 
is very important. 
For the foregoing reasons, Sterling respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
decision of the district court and remand this case for disposition on the merits. 
DATED this 7th day of April, 1997. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
By_ (LLM\ Qui-
L.T>alton Donald Attorneys for Appellant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)532-3333 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two true and correct copies of the within and foregoing APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF ON APPEAL were mailed this 7th day of April, 1997, to the following: 
Jerome Scott 
4393 Margate Lane 
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
o* 4 ? h County State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
t-MU > K h nop,,^  
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STERLING HEALTH MARKETING 
GROUP, INC., an Oregon corporation, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. # 960400207 
vs. I 
DATE: August 1, 1996 
JEROME SCOTT, 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
Defendant. I 
The issue before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Quash Service and Motion to 
Dismiss. Having reviewed Defendant's MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE AND MOTION TO 
DISMISS, Plaintiffs MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
IN RESPONSE TO MOTION TO QUASH and Defendant's REPLY MEMORANDUM TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS, and deeming 
myself sufficiently advised in the premises, I now grant the motion to dismiss. 
Jurisdiction over nonresidents is proper where such "nonresident persons, who, through 
certain significant minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the 
state's protection." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1953). Just as "the rule of law should [] 
protect our citizens from suits in other states, unless they have engaged in some conduct or 
activity there beyond a mere casual or transitory presence therein; [] concomitantly, [] the 
residents of our sister states should be given the same protections here as we expect our 
citizens to be accorded there." Union Ski Company v. Union Plastics Corporation. 548 P.2d 
1257, 1259 (Utah 1976). 
"The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part inquiry to ascertain whether Utah 
courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. See, e.g., Anderson v. American 
SocV of Plastic Surgeons. 807 P. 2d 825 (Utah 1990); Bradford v. Nagle. 763 P.2d 791, 793 
(Utah 1988). First, claims against a nonresident defendant must arise from the activities 
enumerated in the Utah long-arm statute. Anderson. 807 P.2d 825. Secondly, the defendant's 
contacts with Utah must be sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be exercised without violation of 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution." 
Kamdar & Co. v. Larav Co.. Inc.. 815 P. 2d 245, 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "In order to 
satisfy due process requirements, a defendant's contacts with Utah must be "such that 
maintenance of a suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"" 
Kamdar. 815 P. 2d at 249 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U. S. 310 
(1945)). "Accordingly, the defendant^ must have '"purposefully avail[ed]' [himself] of the 
privilege of conducting activities here,"" Kamdar. 815 P.2d at 249 (citing Hanson v. Denckla. 
357 U. S. 235 (1958)). "And they must have "'reasonably anticipate^] being haled into court' 
here."" Kamdar. 815 P.2d at 249 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U. 
S. 286 (1980)). "We must also balance "the convenience of the parties and the interest of the 
State in assuming jurisdiction," by examining "the relationship of the defendant, the forum, 
and the litigation, to each other."" Kamdar. 815 P.2d at 249 (citing Mallorv Engineering v. 
Ted R. Brown & Assocs.. 618 P.2d 1004 (Utah 1980)). 
Applying the standards set by the higher courts of this state and the Supreme Court of 
the United States, this court is satisfied that the contacts of Defendant with this state do not 
satisfy the "minimal contacts" standard required by our legislature and precedent rulings. 
Wherefore, to exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendant in this situation 
would be a violation of his due process right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States ConstitutionAugust 1, 1996. 
Counsel for Defendant will prepare a proposed Order consistent with, and augmenting 
as necessary, the terms of this ruling, and submit it to Plaintiff or counsel for Plaintiff for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision 
has no effect until the Order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this first day of August , 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Lorie D. Fowlke 
Donald L. Dalton 
